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ABSTRACT
Telecommunications provides one of the most well-developed examples of the growth 
of neo-liberalism.  The sector is  interesting since the contrast  between its pre neo-
liberal and post neo-liberal characteristics is particularly stark. This paper explores the 
impacts of neo-liberalism in European telecommunications, placing particular focus 
on the EU institutional  context.  It  considers  the  conseqences  of  neo-liberalism as 
ideology, on the one hand, and practice, on the other. It finds that, ideologically, neo-
liberalism has become deeply pervasive in European telecommunications and for its 
advocates can be regarded as a highly successful project spanning almost 30 years. In 
terms of practice,  the paper argues that the pursuit of neo-liberalism has been less 
successful. In particular, competition has proven complex and difficult to create and 
there  are  concerns  over  the  ability  of  the  neo-liberal  model  to  provide  sufficient 
investment to deliver new Next Generation Networks. However, these deficiencies 
tend to be under-played due to the ideological and rhetorical success of the neo-liberal 
project in telecommunications.
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INTRODUCTION
For the best part of 30 years, the telecommunications sector in Europe has been the 
subject of a radical reorganisation in structural and operational terms, a still ongoing 
process. Regarding governance, little short of a wholesale transformation has occurred 
largely along the lines of neo-liberalism. Change in European telecommunications has 
called  forth  an  extensive  body  of  academic  work,  which  has  focused  on  key 
institutional  and  market-based  developments  at  the  national  and  European  levels. 
Telecommunications thus provides one of the best sectoral examples to reflect on the 
consequences  of the ‘neo-liberal  project’  in Europe,  many of which,  indeed,  have 
already been established, at least to some extent, in the academic literature. This paper 
aims  to  provide  a  contribution  to  this  complex  and  under-addressed  undertaking 
through  exploring  neo-liberalism  in  European  telecommunications  in  terms  of  its 
pervasiveness and efficacy.  In this  respect  two key elements of neo-liberalism are 
dissected: its ideological prowess, on the one hand, and its manifestation as practice, 
on the other. In doing so, the paper argues that, in ideological terms, proponents of 
neo-liberalism – hailing mostly from governmental and business quarters – have been 
outstandingly successful in securing the dissemination and adoption of neo-liberalism 
as  a  ‘view  of  the  world’  for  telecommunications.  Neo-liberalism  in 
telecommunications is rarely questioned (though see Simpson and Wilkinson 2002). 
However,  it  is  in  the  practice  of  neo-liberalism,  where  the  paper  finds  three  key 
concerns around efficacy, despite undoubted improvement in service quality from the 
days of the state run telecommunications utilities of the 1970s.
Firstly,  ‘disciplinary  neo-liberalism’  has  developed  as  an  elaborately  managed 
system  necessitating  a  complex  and  pluri-dimensional  regulatory  network  across 
Europe  the  costs  of  which  are  under-emphasised  due,  in  part,  to  the  desire  by 
academics  to  explore  and  understand  its  novelty.  Second,  the  success  of  neo-
liberalism as an ideological view of the world has masked how difficult it has proven 
to  be  to  create  competition,  of  even  the  most  embryonic  kind,  in  certain 
telecommunications  markets.  Allied  to  this,  there  is  considerable  evidence  of 
resistance from the nation state to complete privatisation of the telecommunications 
incumbent. Third, the preoccupation with markets and competition – inevitable given 
the  ideological  success  of  neo-liberalism  –  has  resulted  in  de-emphasis  of  public 
interest issues in telecommunications,  often relegating them to rhetorical  tokenism, 
that  is,  the  message  that  the  market  will  deliver  in  the  public  interest.  This  is  a 
particularly  pressing  issue  given  the  convergence  of  communications  technologies 
and services on broadband so-called Next Generation Networks (NGNs).
The paper is organised as follows. The following section charts, very briefly, the 
emergence  of  neo-liberalism  as  a  doctrine  and  set  of  practices  in  European 
telecommunications  from approximately  the  late  1970s,  focusing on the European 
Union and its Member States. Particular emphasis is placed on explaining the role 
which neo-liberalism played in the internationalisation of the sector which drew the 
EU in as both an important policy context and institutional actor in the development 
of neo-liberal telecommunications. Thereafter, the paper moves to an exploration of 
the consequences of the adoption of the neo-liberal model for telecommunications in 
Europe:  the  paper’s  third  section  considers  the  core  features  of  ‘neo-liberalised’ 
telecommunications in the EU. Here, it shows how the neo-liberal model has been 
evolutionary  in  nature,  has  been operationalised  by a  range of  public  and private 
actors,  and  has  become  almost  unquestioned  in  its  pervasiveness. 
Telecommunications provides one of the strongest examples of the development of 
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the neo-liberal ‘regulatory’ state. The penultimate section of the paper trains its focus 
on the performance of neo-liberally ordered European telecommunications. Here, the 
paper concerns itself with the extent to which neo-liberalism has been able to realise 
its  raison  d’etre:  free  market  competition.  As  a  corollary,  the  paper  explores  the 
institutional demands of the neo-liberal telecommunications system. It also highlights 
the relative position of public interest issues, placing some emphasis on the extent to 
which  adequate  future  investment  in  NGNs  can  be  secured  through  the  market 
mechanism exclusively. The final section of the paper offers some brief conclusions 
on the significance of neo-liberal era in European telecommunications.
THE  EMERGENCE  OF  NEO-LIBERALISM  IN  EUROPEAN 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
Organised as state run monopolies domestically, with cartel-like interface agreements 
between the national service providers for the exchange of telecommunications traffic 
internationally, the telecommunications sectors of EU states were, for much of the 
20th century,  the  antithesis  of  neo-liberalism.  Bundled  in  with  postal  services, 
telecommunication  was  provided  by  a  series  of  Postal,  Telegraph  and  Telephone 
(PTT)  administrations.  The  provision  of  telecommunications  services  –  voice 
telephony for most users – occurred across a fixed-link infrastructure of exchanges 
and cables. In economic terms, the market was deemed to be close to uncontestable. 
The  network  infrastructure  was  expensive  and  time-consuming  to  construct. 
Considerable  investment  was  necessary  before any revenue could  be generated  to 
recover start up costs. There was no sound economic logic to construct competitive 
fixed networks over the same territory in these circumstances. These economics were 
further  underlined  by  the  social  dimension  of  telecommunication.  As  the  system 
developed, its social purpose as a communication tool became clearer and the goal of 
providing as many people as possible with the ability to access telecommunications 
was established as a policy imperative, particularly after 1945. There were also direct 
economic benefits to be accrued from a widely established and effectively functioning 
telecommunications  system.  This  socio-economic  model  for  telecommunication 
chimed with the established post-war political systems of western Europe, where the 
dominant,  though  by  no  means  unchallenged,  thinking  was  that  the  state  should 
intervene strongly to provide economic and social goods: the era of the corporate state 
was  in  full  swing.  In  other  words,  the  organisation  and  functioning  of  the 
telecommunications sector was underpinned by this particular ideological ‘view of the 
world’. This outline of the telecommunications systems in Europe bears little or no 
resemblance to the current position. Since approximately the late 1970s, the corporate 
state  model  of  telecommunications  in  Europe  has  been  replaced  gradually  by  the 
‘regulatory’ state model (Seidman and Gilmour 1986; Moran 2003). 
Politics aside, by the early 1970s approximately, telecommunications was a sector 
awakening from a period of relative ‘technological slumber’. The subsequent changes 
altered  markedly  the  well-established  economic  characteristics  of  the  sector  and 
placed new demands on those wishing to develop it. New switching and transmission 
technologies  greatly  improved  the  functionality,  but  also  increased  research  and 
development  and  production  costs,  of  the  telecommunications  network.  The 
application  of  computer  technology  to  telecommunications  allowed  terminals  to 
communicate  with  each  other  across  a  network.  This  afforded  a  huge  potential 
expansion in the number of telecommunications services that could be provided to 
users: new value added services (VAS) now could incorporate combinations of voice, 
numerical and other data, text and video. The start up costs of becoming a provider of 
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such services was nowhere near as prohibitive as for ‘traditional’ voice telephony and, 
in  any  event,  after  decades  of  investment,  a  fixed  network  (albeit  in  need  of 
modernisation) was in place, to a considerable extent. 
Whilst  the  techno-economic  nature  of  telecommunications  was  undergoing 
significant change through the 1970s and 1980s, a set of changes of a much greater 
magnitude  entirely  began  to  take  hold  in  the  international  political  economy. 
Emerging to prominence first in the US during the time of the Reagan administration, 
economic neo-liberalism spread initially across Europe - first having been adopted in 
the  UK  -  and,  thereafter,  throughout  much  of  the  global  economy.  The  core 
proposition  of  neo-liberalism  is  a  profound  faith  in  the  efficacy  of  competition 
through market forces. Aside from the commercial success or otherwise accrued by 
the protagonists in competitive markets, in essence neo-liberals argue that efficiently 
functioning  markets  will  yield  three core,  inter-related  broader  long-term benefits: 
lower market prices; better quality of goods and services; and speedier, more dynamic 
technological  progress.  Very importantly,  the neo-liberalism of the late  1970s and 
beyond  was  ‘internationalist’  in  expression:  it  went  hand-in-hand  with  a  much 
vaunted late 20th century globalisation of the economy, underpinning and assisting its 
development in the process. As Huffschmid (2005: 3) argues neo-liberalism emerged 
as a ‘complex social and political strategy responding to the increasing complexity 
and difficulties of capitalist development since the mid-1970s, expressed as a body of 
economic  doctrine,  placing  competition  and  the  market  as  the  driving  forces  of 
economic  and  social  development’.  Here  neo-liberalism  developed  ‘under  the 
ideological  umbrella  of  necessary  adjustments  to  the  all  encompassing  process  of 
globalisation’.
The  intertwined  agendas  of  neo-liberalism  and  globalisation  held  profound 
consequences  for  those  states  which  would  adopt  them  in  chosen  sectors  of  the 
economy. Domestically, where absent or only weakly evident, competition needed to 
be  created  among  industrial  players.  Beyond  this,  in  the  international  scenario, 
barriers to trade, on the one hand, and inward foreign direct investment of various 
kinds, on the other, needed to be very much reduced if not dismantled entirely. The 
crucial corollary was that the status and role of the corporate state in sectors in which 
it was active could no longer be maintained.
To its advocates in the political realm in Europe, the telecommunications sector 
presented  itself  as  a  tailor  made  case  for  the  introduction  of  neo-liberal  reform, 
arguably fortuitously assisted by the aforementioned techno-economic developments 
occurring in the sector. The realisation of this ideological project in practice required 
a radical overhaul of the fundamental structure and functional characteristics of what 
was a highly specific sector domestically and internationally. The UK was the first of 
the EU Member States  to make the decision to adopt a  neo-liberal  model  for the 
telecommunications sector (Morgan and Webber 1986). However, to create changes 
as  radical  as  this  required  the  instigation  of  a  set  of  core  practices,  whose 
pervasiveness more widely in the neo-liberal global political economy has led them to 
be described as ‘disciplinary neo-liberalism’ (Gill 2001, cited in Story 2006). First, 
direct state ownership of the telecommunications incumbent, the PTT, was reduced, 
though significantly in many European national cases, not completely relinquished. 
Second, the new service possibilities in telecommunications, based on opportunities 
afforded by technological  change,  were delivered  through a  competitively  ordered 
market structure. Here, new markets for a plethora of value-added services, as well as 
mobile communications, were created. Third, market competition was created in the 
longest  established  telecommunications  market:  voice  telephony.  The  (partly) 
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privatised incumbent was licensed alongside new commercial competitors to provide 
services  to  consumers.  In  complement,  as  the  process  of  neo-liberalisation  of 
telecommunications became more deeply embedded, a series of sub-markets around 
voice telephony were established on some sort of competitive basis. Fourth, the act of 
governing the evolution of the telecommunications sector, formerly undertaken by the 
corporate state, was ceded through legislation to a series of newly created National 
Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) (Thatcher 2002). These publicly funded, operationally 
independent bodies became what has been described more widely as the ‘citadels of 
regulatory capitalism’ (Levi-Faur, Jordana and Gilardi 2005), responsible, in our case, 
for  undertaking  a  range  of  tasks  associated  with  disciplinary  neo-liberalism  in 
telecommunications.
A major feature of the re-ordering of European telecommunications along neo-
liberal lines has been the role played by the EU. As a once deeply national-centric 
sector of the economy began to become internationalised in outlook, the possibility of 
developing some form of coordination in telecommunications internationally across 
the EU became live. At the EU institutional level, the European Commission proved 
keen to respond to the lobbying of interests initially made up of forerunner liberaliser 
Member  States,  multinational  telecommunications  business  users  and  new  and 
incumbent telecommunications service providers. However, the Commission was far 
from  simply  reactive  and  soon  became  the  key  European  level  institutional 
‘champion’  of  a  neo-liberal  telecommunications  agenda for  the  EU.  The EU was 
projected as a logical policy choice for the changing telecommunications sector. It 
could  be  used  by  Member  States  to  liberalise  and  harmonise  the  parameters  of 
domestic  telecommunications  among  the  EU  partners  in  precise  ways  and  to  a 
mutually  acceptable  timetable.  Creating  a  European  wide  market  in 
telecommunications,  as  part  of  the  much wider  Single  European Market  initiative 
(European Commission 1985), would provide the context to allow the commercial 
exploitation  of  a  burgeoning  sector  within  a  relatively  familiar  European  market 
space.  It  could  also  provide  a  suitable  ‘training  ground’  to  exploit  global 
telecommunications markets should the neo-liberal agenda be more widely adopted, 
as became increasingly the expectation. The EU would, as a consequence, deliver the 
promises of neo-liberalism (lower consumer prices, better service quality and faster 
innovation).  Finally,  it  was  argued  that  the  internationalised  neo-liberalisation  of 
telecommunications through the EU could provide a context to protect,  but also to 
deliver, those elements of the public service tradition of telecommunications still held 
to be of value in the new era.
Thus, from the late 1980s onwards, EU Member States began to utilise the EU 
route to transform their telecommunications sectors. It is important to note that the 
process  did  not  occur  identically  in  all  Member  States,  nor  has  it  been  free  of 
controversy  and  disagreement.  For  example,  the  UK  had  already  liberalised 
comprehensively its telecommunications sector by the time the European Commission 
first produced a neo-liberal policy blueprint for telecommunications in the form of a 
green paper in 1987 (European Commission 1987). Nevertheless, through the 1990s 
and into this decade, the system of EU telecommunications governance has become 
an important and deeply embedded part  of the EU policy canon. It has developed 
within  a  framework  of  legislation,  mostly  in  the  form  of  directives,  requiring 
transposition  and  implementation  at  the  national  level  (Humphreys  and  Simpson 
2005). This has, inevitably, provided considerable scope for variation at the national 
level. The next section explores in detail the shape and core features of the neo-liberal 
telecommunications model as it has developed since the late 1980s.
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THE SHAPE OF THE NEO-LIBERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM IN 
THE EU
Telecommunication is big business. On estimate puts the revenue it generated in 2006 
at Euro 289 billion (European Commission 2007a: 21). In political-economic terms, 
the  sector  now  also  provides  one  of  the  most  prominent  examples  of  the core 
consequence  of  neo-liberalism:  the  replacement  of  the  corporate  state  by  the 
‘regulatory’  state.  The  regulatory  state  in  Europe  has  been  recognised  as  a 
phenomenon in which the EU’s presence is highly significant (Majone 1996). A key 
feature of the European regulatory state in telecommunications has been its constant 
evolutionary  nature.  A  series  of  temporary  points  of  policy  equilibrium  can  be 
recognised (Simpson 2008) the period before which an often intense process of policy 
negotiation, based on a comprehensive review of the ‘state of play’ in the sector, has 
often taken place.
The first major equilibrium point in the neo-liberalisation of telecommunications 
at EU level occurred around 1990 with the agreement by Member States to open their 
markets  for  telecommunications  terminal  equipment  (European Commission 1988) 
and value-added services (European Commission 1990) to EU-wide competition. This 
period was characterised by a short  flurry of political  controversy surrounding the 
successful  attempt  made  by  the  European  Commission  to  pass  the  necessary 
directives without securing the approval of the Council of Ministers. The Commission 
here gave the strongest possible signal of the extent to which it intended to be an 
instigator of the neo-liberal agenda in telecommunications. However, it also became 
aware of the need to ensure that the future development of EU telecommunications 
policy proceeded as consensually as possible. The important denouement reached was 
that the directives were passed as per the originally instigated (Article 86) procedure 
but,  alongside  this,  a  framework  directive  on  Open  Network  Provision  was  also 
created  (European  Parliament  and  Council  1990)  which  would  allow  for  further 
harmonising  legislation  related  to  its  core  subject  matter  to  be  passed,  not  least 
legislation concerning the protection of public service aspects of telecommunications 
(see Humphreys and Simpson 2005).
The second major policy landmark in the liberalisation of EU telecommunications 
occurred in 1993-4 period. Here, in the light of a review and consultation launched in 
1992 (European Commission 1992) EU Member States took what was at the time the 
highly  significant  decision  to  liberalise  all  telecommunications  services  (European 
Council of Ministers 1993) and infrastructures (European Council of Ministers 1994) 
by 1998. At this  juncture,  it  became clear  that  Member States  had signalled their 
commitment  to  the  wholesale  adoption  of  the  neo-liberal  agenda  in 
telecommunications. To create the framework for the pursuit of this to occur required 
the passage of a plethora of liberalisation and harmonisation legislation, which duly 
occurred in the intervening years. However, though the requisite legislation was in 
place by the beginning of 1998, this was merely the beginning of the functioning neo-
liberal telecommunications sector. 
In fact, even before the operationalisation of what became known as the ‘1998 
framework’, the EU, through the European Commission, had begun to explore how 
the regulation of all electronic communications might evolve. This debate, launched 
in 1997 through the by now typical route of a Green Paper followed by a consultation 
process, was premised on the view that ongoing technological convergence between 
IT, telecommunications and broadcasting, yielding new international hybrid markets, 
might require extension of the international neo-liberal regulatory framework which 
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had  been  developing  at  EU  level  to  all  of  electronic  communications  (European 
Commission 1997). The somewhat fractious debate which the Green Paper stimulated 
(see  Michalis  1999)  led  eventually,  in  1999,  to  the  Review  of  Electronic 
Communications (European Commission 1999) whose primary focus was on further 
refinement  of  the  already  agreed  telecommunications  regulatory  framework.  This 
produced  agreement,  in  2002,  on  the  Electronic  Communications  Regulatory 
Framework (ECRF), which became fully operational in July 2003. One of the ECRF’s 
goals  was  to  rationalise:  its  measures  applied  to  all  electronic  communications 
infrastructure  markets  and  the  markets  for  services  associated  with  them.  It  also 
rationalised  the  1998  telecommunications  regulatory  framework  by  reducing  the 
number of legal measures framing it from 20 to 7.  However, the ECRF also provides 
evidence of two of the hallmarks of the neo-liberal regulatory state in action. First, it 
placed  particular  focus  on  the  pursuit  of  competition  in  those  areas  of 
telecommunications which were proving stubbornly resistant to it. In the process and 
as a consequence, the European Commission produced a detailed list of 18 markets in 
telecommunications  which  required  ex-ante  sector  specific  regulation.  Second,  the 
new framework provided evidence  of the kind of detailed  institutional  framework 
required to deliver  the neo-liberal  telecommunications  sector  in Europe at  the EU 
level. Here, the existing EU level committee structure which had developed since the 
late  1980s  was  augmented  to  create  the  Communications  Committee  in  which 
Member State representatives, both technical and political, make key decisions on the 
performance  of  the  framework.  New  committees  were  also  created  to  cover  the 
increasingly  important  areas  of  spectrum  policy  and  data  protection.  Finally,  the 
European Regulators Group, composed of the Heads of Member States’ NRAs, was 
created to advise the European Commission on core regulatory aspects of the ECRF. 
The  negotiations  leading  to  the  creation  of  the  ECRF  also  illustrated  the 
continuing importance of the European Commission as a supranational institutional 
actor  in  the  neo-liberal  European  telecommunications  governance  system.  The 
Commission,  again showing itself  to  be the European level  champion of the neo-
liberalism, pressed Member States hard to be allowed to attain a veto over regulatory 
decisions made at the national level which might not in its judgment be in line with 
the  development  of  the  Single  European  Market  in  telecommunications.  On  this 
occasion, it was successful in obtaining the right to veto designations by NRAs of the 
existence  of  Significant  Market  Power  (SMP)  in  any  telecommunications  market, 
which would thus call forth ex ante regulation to thwart any potential abuse of this 
position by an incumbent. However, the Commission failed to secure a veto right on 
the decisions made by NRAs regarding regulatory remedies specified to improve an 
unsatisfactory competitive situation in any market (Michalis 2004).
The agreement of the ECRF, though highly significant, can only be regarded as 
another  juncture  in  the  development  of  the  regulatory  state,  and  the  neo-liberal 
project,  in  telecommunications  in  the  EU.  In  2006,  the  European  Commission 
launched yet another review exercise, serving to reinforce the almost constant process 
of refinement  of the regulatory parameters  set  out  to govern neo-liberally  ordered 
telecommunications  (European  Commission  2006).  This  review  is  at  the  time  of 
writing uncompleted, though in its final stages. Currently, Member States have been 
asked  to  consider  the  further  modification  of  the  ECRF  through  three  pieces  of 
proposed legislation. A single directive would jointly amend the 2002 directive on a 
common regulatory  regulatory  framework for  electronic  communications  networks 
and  services,  the  2002  directive  on  access  to,  and  interconnection  of,  electronic 
communications networks and services,  and the 2002 directive on authorisation of 
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electronic communications networks and services (European Commission 2007b). A 
second  directive  has  been  proposed  which  would  amend  the  2002  directive  on 
universal service, the 2002 directive on data protection and privacy, as well as the 
2006 regulation on consumer protection cooperation (European Commission 2007c). 
Finally, and most controversially, the Commission has proposed a regulation which 
would create a European Electronic Communications Markets Authority (European 
Commission 2007d). 
The EECMA is significant since, if adopted by Member states, it would create for 
the  first  time  a  supranational  authority  for  telecommunications,  operationally 
independent of the EU’s institutions, though established in EU law and accountable to 
the  European  Parliament.  EECMA  would  have  a  wide  ranging  regulatory  remit, 
broadly along the lines of enforcing the neo-liberal project across the EU. EECMA 
would  be  composed  of  representatives  of  the  EU’s  now  25  telecommunications 
NRAs. Though for the most part  functioning in an advisory capacity,  it  would be 
required  to  develop  a  close  working  relationship  with  the  European Commission, 
already  envisaged  by  the  latter  as  a  partnership.  This  would  mark  a  significant 
reinforcement of the neo-liberal project in telecommunications at the EU level, since 
it  would  give  the  European  Commission,  its  proposer,  the  kind  of  supranational 
regulatory backup which it has recently expressed frustration about the lack of at EU 
level. However, what precise form EECMA takes, or even whether it is created at all, 
is currently in the balance due to the considerable degree of opposition to it which has 
emerged  from NRAs,  the  European  Regulators  Group  and  a  number  of  Member 
States (see Simpson 2008, forthcoming).
The ongoing refinements to the EU’s neo-liberal telecommunications model aside, 
it is also important to note that Member States, through the EU as their representative, 
have  played  a  key  role  in  the  global  institutionalisation  of  the  neo-liberal 
telecommunications model in the World Trade Organization.  Formed in 1995 as a 
result of the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of negotiations, the WTO is the prime 
example of an organisation created to advance the adoption of the neo-liberal model. 
In keeping with the fundamentals of neo-liberalism, the raison d’etre of the WTO is 
the  creation  of  global  competition  through  trade.  However,  the  WTO  has  also 
addressed a range of measures which are related to the facilitation of trade, notably 
inward  investment  and  intellectual  property  protection.  In  telecommunications,  a 
major breakthrough occurred with the signing in 1997 of the Agreement on Basic 
Telecommunications, as a result of which 69 of the world’s states agreed to open up 
their telecommunications services markets to international trade competition. Equally 
significantly, a large number of these signatories, also adopted what became known as 
the Reference Paper on Telecommunications. Here, a set of principles assistive to the 
creation of free market competition were adopted by 57 states, such as the setting up 
of  independent  regulatory  authorities,  non-discriminatory  licensing  and 
interconnection.  It  is  important  to note  that  the EU Member States,  alongside the 
USA,  were  the  prime-movers  in  pushing  for  the  ABT  and  the  Reference  Paper 
(Young 2002). From an EU perspective, the resulting agreements were very much in 
line  with  the  decisions  made by  its  Member  States  regarding  telecommunications 
liberalisation  noted  above.  The  EU  was  successful,  therefore,  in  securing  the 
uploading of its policy preferences to the global trade level in telecommunications, 
and in the process it  has become one of the arch proponents  of neo-liberalism in 
telecommunications at the global level (Simpson and Wilkinson 2002).
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THE  EFFICACY  OF  THE  NEO-LIBERAL  MODEL  IN 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS: IDEOLOGY
The changes wrought by the neo-liberal project in European telecommunications are 
striking in that  they have caused both significant  change to the way in which the 
sector is organised at the domestic level, as well as opening what was one of the most 
national-centric of sectors to shared internationalised governance in Europe through 
the  EU.  In  ideological  terms,  the  spread  of  neo-liberalism  as  a  view of  the  way 
telecommunications should be organised is by now for the most part unquestioned 
nationally  and  at  the  EU  institutional  level.  Whilst  it  took  some  time  for  neo-
liberalism to be accepted across the EU, by the mid-1990s all Member States had 
decided that a competitively ordered telecommunications sector, whilst holding some 
risks regarding exposure to scenarios of commercial competition, held more attendant 
opportunities. From the perspective of ideology, it would be difficult to argue against 
the contention that the pursuit of competition in telecommunications has been adopted 
as  the  ‘right  thing  to  do’  compared  to  the  state  owned  and  administered  public 
monopolies of the 1970s. 
In  ideological  essence,  neo-liberalism  is  as  much about  antipathy  towards  the 
direct interventionist role that might be played by the state as it is about championing 
competition  and  market  forces.  In  this  sense,  neo-liberalism  has  triumphed  over 
corporate state interventionism in the telecommunications sector. It has been argued 
more broadly by Levi-Faur, Jordana and Gilardi (2005: 3-4)) that a newly created 
global regulatory order ‘is much less politicized and contentious, and is proceeding 
much faster’ than previous phases of capitalism. Evidence of this could be found in 
the clearest terms in the landmark 1994 Bangemann Report,  Europe and the Global 
Information  Society, which set out in uncompromising terms the blueprint for neo-
liberal telecommunications in the EU (Bangemann Report 1994). That neo-liberalism 
has  become  deeply  locked-in  as  the  dominant  ideological  perspective  on 
telecommunications  is  evidenced  in  the  recent  policy  rhetoric  of  the  European 
Commission and others in and around the current review of telecommunications. For 
example it has been argued, somewhat naively, by a French Socialist Member of the 
European  Parliament  that  refinements  of  the  ECRF  aimed  at  making  the  EU 
telecommunications  market more competitive ‘would be entirely for the benefit  of 
consumers’  (Trautmann  2006:  1).  In  rejecting  calls  made  by  telecommunications 
incumbents to be given exclusive control over Next Generation Networks in return for 
a major financial commitment on their part to build them, the EU Information Society 
and  Media  Commissioner,  Viviane  Reding,  has  epitomised  the  classic  neo-liberal 
position by arguing that so doing would ‘stifle the competition that  has promoted 
innovation,  choice  and low prices  these past  years’  (Reding 2008a:  5).  Similarly, 
when considering the large equality gap in penetration rates for broadband services 
‘where more than 30% points separate the leading and the last placed Member States’, 
Reding contends that ‘the single most important factor explaining this gap is lack of 
effective competition on the market because access regulation has not been effectively 
implemented’ (Reding 2008b: 2).
However,  in  democratic  terms,  the  slew of  new regulatory  agencies  that  have 
epitomised the regulatory capitalism which neo-liberalism has birthed have neither 
been part of party political manifestos nor consequently have they been ‘brought to 
electorates for discussion and reflection’ (Levi-Faur, Jordana and Gilardi 2005: 4). In 
practical  terms,  the  cost  of  regulatory  capitalism  in  telecommunications  has  been 
insufficiently addressed. The European Commission has made a strong and politically 
opportune  case  for  the  financial  benefits  to  be  accrued  from the  creation  of  the 
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EECMA (European Commission 2007). However, a recently reported estimate by the 
Dutch government claims that the administrative costs of regulation, across the board, 
are as much as 2.5% of GDP (European Voice 2005: 1). In a clear indication of the 
ideological  zeal  with  which  the  neo-liberal  model  has  been  proselytised  by  the 
Commission, Reding, in a speech to the European Competitive Telecommunications 
Association has argued that ‘I count on your continuing support. It will be needed. 
Because  we  have  to  keep  on  explaining,  keep  on  reminding  of  the  benefits  that 
competition brings…This is in the interests of Europe’s economy. And of Europe’s 
citizens’ (Reding 2007: 7).
THE  EFFICACY  OF  THE  NEO-LIBERAL  MODEL  IN 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS: PRACTICE
Despite  the  huge  political  and  financial  investment  made  in  it,  the  creation  of 
competition in telecommunications across the EU – the essence of neo-liberalism – 
has proven difficult. As noted above, the European Commission has become a key 
international  institutional  actor  for  the  promotion  of  competitive  markets  in 
telecommunications.  It  has  also,  however,  played  a  major  role  in  monitoring  the 
development  of  competition  through  the  main  phases  of  EU  telecommunications 
policy  since the late  1980s.  This  process  has  illuminated  a number of features  of 
functioning neo-liberalism across the EU in telecommunications. 
First, competition has proven slow to develop in a number of national markets. 
Member  States  have  often  proven  slow  liberalisers,  for  example.  Regarding  the 
transposition of legislation, early on the Commission upbraided France regarding its 
imposition of a licensing condition which required companies to make a financial 
contribution to research and training in its telecommunications sector as well as a 
delay  in  introducing  legislation  about  licensing  procedures.  It  also  launched 
infringement  proceedings  against  Spain  in  1997  for  failing  to  allow  unrestricted 
establishment  of  new  telecommunications  infrastructures  by  competitors  to  the 
incumbent,  though  Spain  soon  thereafter  became  an  exemplary  transposer  of 
harmonisation directives related to the 1998 Framework. In the late 1990s too, Italy 
was a major cause for concern for the Commission over its transposition of agreed 
measures.  Other  countries  to  have  been  cited  for  poor  transposition  of  certain 
measures  agreed  as  part  of  the  1998  regulatory  package  were  Belgium,  Greece, 
Ireland Luxembourg and Portugal (Humphreys and Simpson 2005: 69-71). 
Regarding the transposition of the ECRF by the agreed deadline of  July 2003, the 
Commission went as far as to commence infringement proceedings at the European 
Court  of  Justice  against  Belgium,  Germany,  Greece,  France,  Luxembourg,  the 
Netherlands (EC  press  release  IP/03/1750,   at 
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p_action.gettxt=gt&doc=IP/03/1750). 
The European Commission in its 2004 report  on the implementation of the ECRF 
noted that necessary legislation was still  missing from the statute books of  Spain, 
France, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia. In this report also, 
whilst noting the development of competition in a number of areas, the Commission 
also pointed out that incumbents market share of  local call markets was high in certin 
cases. The Commission also complained about the independence of certain NRAs,  as 
well  as  the  length  of  time  taken  to  deal  with  regulatory  appeals  (European 
Commission 2004).  In terms of implementation of the agreed legislation, there were 
complaints  from  new  entrant  companies  regarding  interconnection  agreements  in 
Austria,  Belgium,  France and Germany in the late  1990s.  The Commission  noted 
differences in accounting practices, pricing and interconnection tariffs throughout EU 
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Member states (Humphreys and Simpson 2005: 79). In 2002, in the local call market 
the  former  incumbents  still  held  on  average  90%  of  the  market  (European 
Commission 2002: 4-5).
Second, the creation of a uniform neo-liberalised model of telecommunications at 
the international  (EU) level  has  been difficult  realise.  In fact,  telecommunications 
provides evidence that different kinds of neo-liberal model have developed in sectors 
where globalisation has provided at least part of the rationale for developments. The 
‘domestication effect’ is a strong feature of (neo)liberalised telecommunications.  For 
example,  though  Member  States  have  established  NRAs,  the  precise  institutional 
design of these agencies has been adapted to domestic conditions. NRAs had also 
tended to play more or less influential roles in regulatory decision making which went 
on at  EU level.  The degree of  independence  of NRAs from government  has  also 
varied since the latter was not a criterion of EU policy (see Humphreys and Simpson 
2005: 73-78). The Commission has developed a system for collecting regulatory data 
from Member states, often through commissioning consultants to undertake studies to 
derive  regulatory  benchmarks  and systems of  best  practice  In  complement,  it  has 
employed the ‘naming and shaming’ tactic in its series of implementation reports on 
the regulatory framework (Humphreys and Simpson 2005: 88).
 Third, the neo-liberal system of telecommunications in Europe has required an 
elaborate  set  of  rules  which have constantly  been modified  in  an effort  to  realise 
functioning  competition.  Often  telecommunications  firms,  especially  incumbents, 
have  been  able  to  disguise  costs,  due  to  the  problem  of  information  asymmetry 
between them and the regulatory authority.  The regulatory workload from this has 
been  highly  significant,  despite  efforts  made by the  EU to  streamline  the  system 
through time. For example, the creation of the ECRF in 2002 was accompanied by a 
significant  expansion  in  the  number  of  designated  markets  in  telecommunications 
subject to ex ante regulation to as many as 18. These markets all required regular 
detailed reviews by NRAs and the European Commission. The change made to the 
definition of Significant Market Power through lowering the market threshold, for ex-
ante regulation, to the level of general competition policy was also accompanied by a 
more detailed range of criteria which had to be examined in deciding whether or not 
SMP existed, involving more work for regulators. The ECRF also required NRAs to 
undertake work more speedily to settle regulatory disputes arising in their jurisdiction. 
The European Commission voiced its displeasure at the speed at which decisions were 
being made citing the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, the UK, Finland and France as 
culprits (European Commission 2002). This list comprises a very wide range of EU 
Member  States,  both  initial  policy  leaders  and  relative  laggards  in 
telecommunications liberalisation. Increased bureaucracy also was created for NRAs 
with the requirement placed upon them by the ECRF under its Framework directive to 
report any regulatory decisions made in this regard to the Commission for its scrutiny, 
placing  additional  regulatory  pressure  on  the  latter  too.  The  so  called  article  7 
procedure on notifications had by the end of 2007 resulted in as many as 700 ex ante 
measures having been notified to the Commission (Reding 2007: 3).
Fourth,  in  complement,  neo-liberalism  has  produced  a  complex  system  of 
regulatory  actors.  Here,  a  two  level  pluralilateral  regulatory  network  can  be 
characterised  composed  of  the  European  Commission,  NRAs,  governmental 
representatives and telecommunications companies (Humphreys and Simpson 2008). 
From the outset, a series of technocratic EU regulatory committees were created to 
establish and implement the disciplines of neo-liberalism in telecommunications. A 
High Level Regulators Group was created as early as 1992 as a policy forum for EU 
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ministerial representation in telecommunications. The ONP and Licensing committees 
were created to deal with the complex and specialised matters arising in these areas. 
This series of committees served to create a regulatory network of people keen to 
solve technical problems and exchange best practice with each other. Outside the EU, 
the  NRAs  in  1997  established  the  Independent  Regulators  Group  which  was  a 
problem  solving  and  learning  forum which  has  actually  come  to  be  a  source  of 
irritation to the Commission. In its communications review of 1999, the European 
Commission  proposed  the  creation  of  the  Communications  Committee  aimed  at 
streamlining  the  existing  comitology  around  the  ONP and  Licensing  committees. 
However, despite this the agreement of the ECRF in 2002 produced an increase in the 
number of regulatory committees at EU level from 3 to 5 with the creation of the 
European Regulators Group, the Radio Spectrum Policy Group, the Communications 
Committee, the Radio Spectrum Committee and the Working Party on the Protection 
of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data.
Fifth, the EU telecommunications governance system has been characterised by 
the aspirations of the European Commission to move to a situation where as much ex 
ante sector specific regulation is withdrawn from telecommunications as possible. At 
times, this has taken on the air of trying to use the move towards utilising general 
competition law as a justification for the success of the neo-liberal project in itself. In 
the 2002 review of telecommunications, for example, as noted above, the Commission 
was successful  in  persuading  Member  States  to  lower the  threshold  level  beyond 
which Significant Market Power (SMP), and thus the onset of ex ante regulation, is 
designated. 
In the current review of the ECRF, the European Commission has been criticised 
strongly  by  the  ERG  for  proposing  a  radical  reduction  in  the  number  of 
telecommunications  markets,  from  18  to  7,  that  would  be  covered  by  ex  ante 
regulation. The political motive for the move is to demonstrate that neo-liberalism is 
working  strongly.  However,  Viviane  Reding,  EU  Commissioner  for  Information 
Society and Media, has noted that the new proposed rules would still require NRAs to 
examine all markets closely, which may well require regulatory intervention in the 
markets that would be removed from the Commission’s list (Reding 2007).  Despite 
much  concerted  effort,  it  is  clear  that  the  position  of  the  (former  PTT) 
telecommunications incumbent is still stubbornly strong in the sector across Europe, 
illustrating the difficulty of creating neo-liberal  competition in spite of the kind of 
severe economic engineering through regulation which has characterised the sector. 
There is also a residual national political element to this. The recent dispute between 
Germany and the European Commission over the former’s desire to grant a regulatory 
holiday to Deutsche Telekom in return for its commitment to invest in NGNs shows 
the selectivity with which elements of the neo-liberal model are approached, as well 
as, when deemed necessary, the direct interventionist presence of state. 
The current review of the ECRF gives an important flavour of the state of the neo-
liberal project in telecommunications. The Commission still complains of delayed and 
inconsistent  remedies  and a  generally  fragmented  approach  to  regulation  (Reding 
2007:  2-3).  Viviane  Reding  has  argued that  it  ‘would  be  an  illusion  that…single 
market  shortcomings will  just  go away by themselves.  They are  embedded in the 
regulatory structure we have today (ibid: 4). The Commission has argued in strident 
terms  that  ‘Implementation  of  the  EU  rules  via  27  separate  national  regulatory 
systems has resulted in two major drawbacks: the artificial segmentation of markets 
on national basis and a fundamental lack of consistency in the way the EU rules are 
applied’ (European Commission 2007e: 7).
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The issue of the extent to which the neo-liberal model in telecommunications can 
deliver so-called Next Generation Networks is currently one of the most important 
debates  in  European  telecommunications  policy.  Even  its  advocates  have  noted  a 
comparative lack of investment  in Europe compared to the USA and Asia,  where 
deficiencies  in  the  current  regulatory  model  are  seen  as  problematic  (Trautmann 
2006). In a related way, Viviane Reding has recently noted that as much as 89.5% of 
control of direct access to customers is in the hands of the former incumbents (Reding 
2007a: 2; European Commission 2008) providing little or no competition here and 
raising  a  significant  question  mark  over  which  organisations  might  provide  NGN 
investments, if not the incumbents.  In fact, even in the most competitive countries in 
this regard, a hardly impressive just over 20% of subscribers utilise an alternative to 
the incumbent for network access whilst the figure is at or close to zero in five EU 
states,  among which  are  Finland and Greece  (Reding 2007c:  2).  Reding  has  also 
neatly highlighted what is likely to be the Commission’s approach to the creation of 
NGNs  where  the  very  difficult  task  of  getting  ‘“appropriate”  regulation  that 
safeguards competition whilst creating new incentives for investment’ (Reding 2007b: 
2) will be undertaken. The Commission has acknowledged that those countries with 
highest broadband penetration rates are those which have been able to create readily 
alternative infrastructure competition with telecommunications, such as that available 
through the cable TV sector. Another route has been through the provision of strict 
i.e.  heavily  regulated,  unbundling  requirements  in  telecommunications  (European 
Commission 2007a: 14). In Europe, major engineering work to replace copper cables 
will have to be undertaken. As noted above, the Commission is deeply opposed to the 
granting of regulatory holidays to incumbents in return for commitments from them to 
invest in NGNs (European Commission 2006. 
There is considerable doubt about this most neo-liberal solutions to the current 
core  investment  problem  of  telecommunications.  Even  Vivane  Reding  has 
acknowledged  that  the  point-to-point  fibre  deployment  which  allows  unbundled 
access ‘is rarely being deployed by market investors’ but is, on the contrary being 
utilised more often ‘in open access schemes initiated by municipalities’ (Reding 2008: 
5) suggesting that a different model than neo-liberalism might be developed to deliver 
NGNs in the future. Whilst dismissing their widespread utility, Reding has however 
argued that ‘industry and regulators should consider well these models because they 
represent a legitimate concern by local representatives who want to have a future-
oriented  and  open  network  in  their  city’  (ibid).   Whilst  the  EU  has  since  2000 
increased significantly the level of competition in Member States through local loop 
unbundling facilitated by a Regulation (European Parliament and Council 2000) this 
merely reflects the neo-liberal model’s obsession with creating competition as an end 
product. It is as yet by no means clear that the pattern of competition that has taken 
such a time to engineer across the EU in telecommunication will deliver timely and 
extensive network investment of the kind deemed to be currently urgent.
It may well be worth re-considering certain elements of the telecommunications 
sector – in this case the core infrastructure – as a public good. Within this, those 
elements of the telecommunications which have proven to be contestable in market 
terms could be allowed to flourish whilst the others might be delivered through the 
public sector, perhaps in conjunction with one or more regulated private entities in the 
public interest.
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CONCLUSION
The neo-liberal project in telecommunications in Europe, over approximately the last 
30 years, has been hugely influential. Neo-liberalism as a political ideology has been 
adopted for the most part without serious questioning and practised at the national and 
the  EU levels,  couched  within  the  wider  agenda  of  globalisation.  In  terms  of  its 
pervasiveness, as a blueprint for the running of the telecommunications sector, neo-
liberalism can only be regarded as having been outstandingly successful. However, as 
this  paper  has  shown,  though  often  trumpeted  as  an  exemplar  of  the  unqualified 
success of the general  neo-liberal  model,  in practice the picture  is  more complex. 
Often the dogmatic ideological antipathy of neo-liberalism towards the state, and the 
public sector more broadly, has created blindspots not only to its practical costs but 
also its limitations. Regarding the former, the onset of neo-liberalism has required the 
creation  of a large and intricate  system of  regulation.  It  has  been argued that  the 
‘reluctance  of  the  Commission  to  go one  step  further  in  the  promotion  of  public 
services stands in strong contrast to the resolve which the same institution displays 
with regard to liberalisation and further market opening’ (Huffschmid et al. 2005: 67).
It  is  clear  that  telecommunication  exemplifies  complex  21st century  regulatory 
capitalism as much as the basic functioning characteristics of neo-liberalism. Much of 
the  interventionism  of  the  old  corporate  state  in  telecommunications  has  been 
reincarnated as the ‘regulatory’ state in telecommunications. One of its core features 
is that decisions are moved from the political to the technical, yet the process of doing 
this is ideological in itself. The elaborate apparatus of the European regulatory state in 
telecommunications -  involving epistemic communities of regulators with different 
kinds of  expertise, government officials and private sector players – requires a level 
of resourcing which has only yet been given cursory treatment by scholars but which 
is undoubtedly substantial. It is clearly the case that a very large amount of socio-
economic engineering, through regulation, has been necessary to create competition 
of even a minimally acceptable kind across the markets of the telecommunications 
sector. Even with this, the stubborn persistence of competition bottlenecks is more 
than a little suggestive of the uncontestability of certain markets. The core question 
for  Europe’s  telecommunications  policymakers  must  be:  is  the effort  necessary to 
achieve  rudimentary  competition  worth  the  rewards?  In  the  current  ideological 
paradigm, epitomised in the EU’s current review and re-working of the ECRF, the 
answer appears to be a resounding ‘yes’.
There is no doubt that during the neo-liberal paradigm in telecommunications a 
transformation in the nature of telecommunications services has occurred. Similarly, 
the cost of core basic telecommunications services has fallen dramatically. However, 
it  should  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  period  in  question  has  witnessed  significant 
technological change, as a result of which basic services could be expected to become 
cheaper. The thrust of neo-liberal competition, where it exists, may have spurred on 
the  creation  of  new services  and price  reductions  more than  would  an alternative 
model of organisation, though this would be an argument which in practical terms is 
almost  impossible  to  falsify,  given  the  pervasiveness  of  the  commitment  to  neo-
liberalism across the EU which has taken hold since the mid to late 1980s. That aside, 
for  example,  though  mobile  roaming  charges  were  reduced  significantly  after 
Commission  action  in  2006-07,  given  the  length  of  time taken  to  affect  this,  the 
situation can be regarded as a failure of neo-liberal  telecommunications regulation 
rather than the success heralded by the Commission. It cannot be denied that prices 
for  telecommunications  services  have  fallen.  The  European  Commission  has 
calculated that in 2006 ‘consumers in the EU15 spent around 27% less for the same 
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telecoms services than 10 years ago – in real terms this represents a 40% decrease’ 
(European Commission 2007a:  12).  Nonetheless,  the  Commission,  after  nearly  30 
years  of  neo-liberalism,  has  also  recently  acknowledged  that  ‘while  a  number  of 
markets have already become effectively competitive, the overall picture is of market 
failures (especially dominance) across most markets’ (European Commission 2007: 
24). Given the areas where neo-liberalism has failed to deliver (alongside those areas 
where it has been successful) it may be important to ‘abandon the a priori assumption 
of  the  general  superiority  of  the  market’  (Huffschmid  et  al.  2007:  235).  This, 
however, appears unlikely to occur to any significant extent in the foreseeable future.
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